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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
The Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖) issued 
a letter opining that facilities operated by Ocean County 
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Landfill Corporation (―OCLC‖) and Manchester Renewal 
Power Holdings (―MRPC‖) were under common control for 
the purposes of air emissions permitting.  In this petition for 
review, OCLC challenges that determination under subsection 
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) 
(providing for judicial review of any ―final action‖ by the 
EPA).  The EPA moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  We now grant that motion.   
I.  Background 
Under Title V of the Clean Air Act, certain stationary 
sources of air pollution must obtain federal operating permits.  
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f.  Although a federal 
requirement, Title V permitting programs are administered 
and enforced primarily by state and local air permitting 
authorities, though EPA oversight continues.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661a(d)(1).  That is the case in New Jersey, where the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(―NJDEP‖) acts as the statewide Title V permitting authority.  
See 40 C.F.R. § 70, App. A.   
OCLC owns and operates a municipal solid waste 
landfill in Ocean County, New Jersey.  MRPC operates a gas-
to-energy facility on adjacent property.  Currently, each entity 
operates under its own Title V permit. 
MRPC‘s permit expired in 2004, and it sought 
renewal.  In March 2005, the NJDEP issued a draft permit for 
public comment.  Three months later, the EPA notified the 
NJDEP that there appeared to be a common control 
relationship between OCLC‘s landfill and MRPC‘s gas-to-
energy facility, and requested a common control 
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determination from the State.
1
  When the State failed to take 
action, the EPA formally objected to the draft permit.   
Subsequently, the NJDEP requested the EPA‘s assistance in 
making the determination. 
Over the next several years, with substantial input 
from OCLC and MRPC, the EPA assisted the NJDEP in 
conducting the common control analysis.  This process 
culminated on May 11, 2009, when the EPA sent a letter to 
both entities advising them that the process had been 
concluded, and that it had found OCLC and MRPC to be 
under common control.
2
  The letter indicated that the EPA 
                                              
1
  Two or more stationary sources of air pollution may be 
considered a single source for air pollution permitting 
purposes if they are ―located within a contiguous area and 
under common control.‖  42 U.S.C. § 7661(2).  The phrase 
―common control‖ is not defined in the statute, but, elsewhere 
in its regulations, the EPA has defined it as ―the power to 
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of a person or organization, whether by ownership of stock, 
voting rights, by contract, or otherwise.‖  40 C.F.R. § 66.3(f) 
(setting forth when penalties may be imposed on a source that 
fails to meet a deadline or make an upgrade).   
 
2
  The EPA presumes that two entities are under common 
control when one operator locates on the property of another.  
JA 10.  Because the OCLC and MRPC facilities are both 
located on property owned by OCLC‘s corporate parent, the 
Atlantic Pier Company, Inc. (―APC‖), the EPA employed the 
presumption.  Id.  In its letter of May 11, 2009, the EPA also 
pointed to the elaborate contractual relationships connecting 
the two entities and articulated the following (non-exhaustive) 
list of factors in support of its determination of common 
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―render[ed] the determination as final,‖ and would require the 
existing Title V permits to be ―reopened and reissued to both 
companies as a single source.‖  The EPA also noted that it 
had ―directed NJDEP to proceed with permit modification, as 
required, to reflect the single source status of [OCLC] and 
[MRPC] operations,‖ although the NJDEP has yet to take any 
action.  Under New Jersey‘s application shield law, OCLC 
and MRPC will continue to operate under the conditions 
imposed by their expired permits until NJDEP issues a new 
permit.
3
  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:27-22.8.   
II.  Discussion 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), we have 
jurisdiction over ―any . . . final action of the Administrator.‖  
Thus, the question before us is whether the EPA‘s common 
control determination is ―final action‖ within the meaning of 
the statute.   
―As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied 
for agency action to be ‗final‘:  First, the action must mark the 
‗consummation‘ of the agency‘s decisionmaking process . . . 
– it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.  
                                                                                                     
control: (1) APC retains control over some stock in MRPC‘s 
subsidiary, Ocean Energy Holdings (―OEC‖), that APC sold 
to MRPC; (2) MRPC depends on OCLC as its only source of 
fuel; (3) MRPC and OEC are not allowed to sell or transfer 
gas to another entity without written consent from a 
subsidiary of APC; and (4) the entities have a financial 
interest in each other (i.e., MRPC shares tax credits with 
APC).   
 
3
  We use the singular only for convenience, as we realize the 
theoretical possibility of new, but separate, permits. 
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And second, the action must be one by which ‗rights or 
obligations have been determined,‘ or from which ‗legal 
consequences will flow‘ . . . .‖  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 177-78 (1997) (internal citations omitted).  We review 
the following factors to determine whether an agency action 
is final:   
1) whether the decision represents the agency‘s 
definitive position on the question; 2) whether 
the decision has the status of law with the 
expectation of immediate compliance; 3) 
whether the decision has immediate impact on 
the day-to-day operations of the party seeking 
review; 4) whether the decision involves a pure 
question of law that does not require further 
factual development; and 5) whether immediate 
judicial review would speed enforcement of the 
relevant act. 
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 
69 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).   
OCLC argues that the EPA‘s common control 
determination is final agency action because the EPA, in its 
letter of May 11, 2009, described its decision as ―final‖ and 
required immediate enforcement of its decision by demanding 
that OCLC and MRPC‘s existing permits be ―reopened and 
reissued to both companies as a single source.‖  We disagree.   
First, although the EPA described its decision as 
―final,‖ it reasonably explains this comment to be in reference 
to the four-year-long process of making its common control 
determination.  EPA‘s letter is not ―final‖ in the sense 
required for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
because the letter was only one, intermediate, step in the 
permitting process.  Before a new permit governing OCLC 
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and MRPC will issue, the NJDEP must provide the parties 
and the EPA with notice and an opportunity to comment on 
any draft permit.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(b)(6), 7661d(a).  
The EPA will also have an opportunity to object formally to 
the draft permit, and, if the NJDEP declines to address the 
EPA‘s objections, to take over the permitting process from 
the State.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)-(c).  There is no way to 
know in advance whether the final permit that results from 
that process will incorporate the common control 
determination that OCLC seeks to challenge here.  Thus, a 
new permit, not intermediate decisions, will mark the 
―consummation‖ of the agency‘s decisionmaking process.   
Second, the EPA‘s decision does not contemplate 
immediate compliance.  Although the EPA has directed the 
NJDEP to accept its determination and begin a new 
permitting process, the NJDEP has yet to do either formally.  
OCLC contends that the NJDEP has agreed to rely on the 
EPA‘s decision, but this is also not dispositive.  See, e.g., 
Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 163 (3d Cir. 1998) (―[W]here 
a state actor relies upon a federal agency‘s notice, the state 
action does not convert the notice into a final agency act 
under the APA.‖).   
Additionally, OCLC will continue to operate under the 
terms of its existing permits until a new permit issues.  
Therefore, and third, the EPA‘s decision has no effect on 
OCLC‘s day-to-day operations.   
Fourth, the question of the validity of the EPA‘s 
common control determination is not purely a legal one: our 
ability to decide the issue would benefit greatly from 
additional facts, most importantly the terms of a new permit 
and whether and/or how it will harm OCLC and, perhaps, 
how the new permit affects MRPC, which is not a party to 
OCLC‘s petition for review.   
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Finally, our immediate review would not speed 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act.  To the contrary, it would 
delay further the permitting process.   
In sum, the EPA‘s common control decision simply is 
not final agency action, which will only occur when a new 
permit issues. 
The text of the statute bolsters our conclusion.  
Specifically,  42 U.S.C. § 7661d(c) provides that "[n]o [EPA] 
objection shall be subject to judicial review until the 
Administrator takes final action to issue or deny a permit 
under this subsection."  Although OCLC correctly points out 
that the EPA's May 11, 2009 common control determination 
was not itself a formal EPA "objection" to a draft permit, it 
arose out of, and directly relates to, EPA's formal objection to 
the NJDEP's draft permit for MRPC.   We therefore regard 
§ 7661d(c) as indicating Congress's intent to subject those 
objections to judicial review only after the EPA's issuance or 
denial of a permit.  By contrast, the statutory provision on 
which OCLC seeks to rely, 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2), plainly 
does not apply here.  That section provides for immediate 
judicial review when the EPA denies a third party's petition 
requesting that the EPA object to a draft permit.  In this case, 
OCLC has not petitioned the EPA to object to a draft permit; 
instead, it effectively has asked EPA to withdraw its objection 
to the NJDEP's draft permit for MRPC. 
Several other Courts of Appeals have reached the same 
conclusion in similar circumstances.  In Public Service 
Company of Colorado v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that two EPA letters, which set forth the 
agency‘s common control determination as to certain 
facilities, were not final action.  225 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 
2000).  The Court dismissed the challenge for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that the EPA‘s opinion letters ―in no way 
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mark the consummation of its decision-making process, 
which cannot occur before the [Colorado Department of 
Public Health and Environment] has acted on the permit 
application.‖  Id. at 1147.  The Court went on to note that the 
letters ―do not determine any rights or obligations of [the 
Public Service Company] or any other entity; nor do legal 
consequences flow from these letters.‖  Id. at 1148 (citing 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(―[Statutory] interpretations such as those in [agency] opinion 
letters . . . lack the force of law . . . .‖)). 
OCLC attempts to distinguish Public Service Company 
on grounds that the EPA letters in that case neither stated that 
the agency‘s determination was final nor directed the State to 
enforce the determination.  OCLC argues further that the state 
permitting agency retained authority to decide that the 
facilities at issue were not under common control, and thus 
the EPA letters were more like ―tentative recommendations.‖  
Id. at 1147.   
These arguments do not persuade us.  First, as 
discussed above, the EPA‘s characterization of its decision as 
―final‖ is not dispositive.  Moreover, although the EPA has 
directed the NJDEP to reopen the permitting process, the 
latter retains the authority to decline or delay adopting the 
determination and set the terms of the new permit.  In 
addition, as the Tenth Circuit opined, ―[e]ven if the [State] 
accedes to the EPA‘s opinion . . . and denies the . . . permit, 
the opinion letters still would not constitute the 
consummation of EPA‘s decision-making process.‖  Id. at 
1148.  Here, as in that case, once the NJDEP issues a permit, 
OCLC will be entitled to challenge it in state court, and the 
―EPA might well be convinced by a decision rendered in state 
court‖ to reverse itself on the common control decision.  Id.  
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The reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in American Paper Institute, Inc. v. EPA also applies 
here.  882 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1989).  In that case, the 
American Paper Institute sought judicial review of a policy 
statement drafted by EPA Region V.  The Seventh Circuit 
Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, stating 
that  
Region V does not demand that any firm change 
its conduct now . . . .  Every permit holder may 
proceed under the authority of its existing 
permit. . . .  If states heed [Region V‘s] 
suggestions to the detriment of paper mills, 
review is possible in state court.  If states 
propose a course of action inconsistent with 
Region V‘s wishes, the Administrator may 
overrule Region V.  If the Administrator adopts 
Region V‘s position and a permit is turned 
down, modified, or rescinded, review will be 
available in state or federal court.  That review, 
on a full record, will disclose the EPA‘s final 
position, as applied to the plant in question.   
Id. at 289.  Similarly, here, if the NJDEP adopts the EPA‘s 
determination and issues a permit that OCLC believes to be to 
its detriment, OCLC may seek review in state court.  If the 
NJDEP refuses to adopt the EPA‘s determination, the 
Administrator may overrule that decision, and review will be 
available in state or federal court.  See Appalachian Energy 
Group v. EPA, 33 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994) (dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction a challenge to a memo in which the EPA 
opined that a permit would be required for certain storm 
water discharges from construction activities because, among 
other reasons, the EPA had not issued or denied a permit); 
City of San Diego v. Whitman, 242 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(dismissing San Diego‘s challenge to an EPA letter—opining 
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that the Oceans Pollution Reduction Act would apply to the 
City‘s pollution discharge permit renewal—because agency 
action would not be final until the completion of the permit 
appeals process).      
The cases cited by OCLC are distinguishable.  For 
example, in Star Enterprise v. EPA, both parties conceded 
that the determination at issue (that certain regulations 
promulgated under the Clean Air Act applied to gas turbines 
in an electrical power plant) was final agency action.  235 
F.3d 139, 146 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).  Likewise, in Hawaiian 
Electric Company v. EPA, the agency determined that 
Hawaiian Electric Company‘s proposed change to higher 
sulfur fuel would be a ―major modification‖ that would 
trigger a permitting process.  723 F.2d 1440, 1441 (9th Cir. 
1984).  Consistent with the EPA‘s position in that case, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
determination was final and reviewable because it represented 
―EPA‘s final statement on the legal issues‖ and had 
immediate legal consequences – namely, that the company 
had to obtain a permit before switching fuels.  Id. at 1442.  
Clearly, the situation here is different, as OCLC must obtain a 
permit regardless of the EPA‘s determination on the issue of 
common control.
 4
   
                                              
4
  We also question whether Hawaiian Electric was correctly 
decided, as it seems to be at odds with FTC v. Standard Oil 
Company, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980), in which the Supreme 
Court held that regulatory proceedings before an agency are 
―different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending 
what heretofore has been considered to be final agency 
action.‖  Along the same lines, a more recent decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggests that ―costs of 
statutory compliance,‖ such as the costs of undergoing 
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In sum, the EPA determination at issue here, an 
interlocutory decision in the larger permitting process, ―defies 
characterization . . . as ‗final action‘ from which an appeal 
may be taken . . . .‖  Public Serv. Co., 225 F.3d at 1149.   
III.  Conclusion 
For these reasons, the EPA‘s common control 
determination is not ―final action‖ within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b).  Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to hear 




                                                                                                     
permitting proceedings, must be borne by the private party 
and do not render an agency decision ―final‖ for purposes of 
judicial review.  Fairbanks N. State Borough v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 596 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(contrasting Helca Mining Co. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 164 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that EPA action initiating permitting 
proceedings was not final agency action), with Hawaiian 
Electric). 
